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Given recent developments in information technology and intellectual property (IP) legislation, technology firms
may benefit from an integrated IP strategy that combines patenting with strategic disclosure. This article presents
a series of cases that introduce various aspects of strategic disclosure and provide a framework for how and
when such practices may be merited as part of an integrated IP strategy. To help CEOs decide on the economics
and efficiency of the practice, practical guidelines are provided for when it might be a useful complement to the
firm’s other IP management practices. (Keywords: Intellectual Property, Patents, Innovation Management)
“The underlying reason for strategic disclosure is, of course, to create prior art, but
in one technology field we are directed toward our direct competitors, and in the
other field we are more oriented to the next level of the value chain, where you
create disclosure to have freedom to operate and not be bound to one of the differ-
ent partners in the value chain. So if they file before you they might block you and
get an exclusive arrangement, which for a big chemical company is something
you’re not really looking for.”1
When German multinational BASF develops a new chemical orcompound, the company has a number of factors to take intoconsideration. Using modern computational analysis, it is easyto determine with which substances a chemical will react, but
without further testing, the utility of those reactions is unknown. Therefore, a
novel chemical compound may well be patentable, but the secondary products
are not immediately so.2 By strategically disclosing the potential secondary prod-
ucts, BASF effectively extends the scope of a patented product, and thus creates
options for “value transportation” as outlined by Conley et al. in this issue.3 In
other situations, BASF offers products in highly competitive, fast-paced industries
with rapidly changing product compositions. The various permutations of, for
instance, a novel pigment (e.g., cream, gel, spray, and pencil) are practically lim-
itless. Naming each of them in a patent may take longer than any one of them
stays in fashion; and by the time competitors see the patent application, several
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fashion cycles will have passed. By revealing the
patented product and its plethora of consumer
uses, BASF preempts its competitors and directs
its customers to the potential of the BASF product.
The above example illustrates a few of the
many ways in which strategic disclosure—the act
of creating novelty-destroying prior art in order
to prevent or impede another agent from being
able to obtain IP protection on the same or a sim-
ilar invention or artistic or literary creation4—can
be used as part of an integrated intellectual prop-
erty (IP) strategy. In this article, we examine how
firms can integrate disclosure with patenting.
Given recent shifts in legislation, in the availability of information, and in the
changing competitive landscape, prior rationales for patent-centric regimes may
no longer be exclusively true. Today’s executives may be well served to consider
adding strategic disclosure to their arsenal of IP tools.
IP as a Resource to Serve a Firm’s Strategic Motivations
Although patents and intellectual property have long been operational ele-
ments in businesses, using IP protection as a strategic tool—in particular, matching
it to an organizational or industry dynamic—has only recently gained greater
traction.5 In many cases, such discussions largely focus on patents and exclusive
property rights as drivers of value capture. Yet three important developments stand
out as factors that have made markets—especially markets for ideas—more
dynamic. First, the proliferation of the Internet means that information is available
both in terms of quantity and geographic reach that were unthinkable just a decade
ago. Second, the creation of prior art and publication databases that provide patent
examiners around the world instant access to disclosed inventions makes prior art
search much easier.6 Third, the recent change in the U.S. patent law from first-
to-invent to first-inventor-to-file that brings the U.S. code in line with much of
the rest of the world7 has implications for firms’ procedures with regard to disclos-
ing inventions.8 Add to these factors the context of an increasing backlog of patent
applications, and one has a recipe for dynamic markets riddled with uncertainty.9
These interrelated developments offer both opportunities and risks for obtaining,
controlling, and defending proprietary knowledge, and require firms to rethink
how they manage patenting and non-patenting practices. As a result, it has become
more difficult for a firm to achieve an exclusive market position for long periods of
time. In particular, less-powerful market actors—e.g., small and medium-sized firms,
new entrants, corporate spinoffs, and trailing competitors—may seek freedom to operate
(FTO) rather than exclusivity in an effort to tilt dynamic markets in their favor.10
Given these dynamic changes in industry and increasing uncertainty in the
IP realm, technology firms may benefit from an integrated IP strategy that com-
bines patenting with strategic disclosure. Such an integrated IP regime can effi-
ciently protect FTO under technological and market uncertainty, strengthen
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the market position of a firm, and secure growth options. While large firms have
long been using strategic disclosure (e.g., IBM, Xerox, Siemens, Motorola, Yahoo,
Cisco, Lenovo, just to name a few), it is perplexing why this practice is not more
widespread. Recent research indicates that, outside of the community of primarily
large firms that already use it, only 36% of firms are aware of the practice of stra-
tegic disclosure, and less than one third of those have an expressed interest in
using it as a tool in their IP management.11 Even in the academic literature, stud-
ies of the strategic use of disclosure are scant.12 This implies an underutilized
potential for new approaches to effectively align IP management and firm strat-
egy, and it appears to be driven largely by a lack of awareness as well as a lack
of procedural knowledge of how to exploit the specific economics of non-patenting
strategies.
Although both academic and practitioner work tend to focus on patenting
as a means of protecting a firm’s market advantage, findings indicate that, for
large firms, only about 10% of their IP portfolios directly serve the commercializa-
tion of their products,13 while the remaining portion serves more for licensing,
blocking, or other purposes.14 These excess patents serve important purposes for
large firms, yet evidence suggests that the majority of firms—especially new
entrants in the form of independent startups or corporate spin-offs or other
smaller firms—cannot afford such excessive patenting, as they tend to have fewer
resources.15 For those well versed in the legalities of patents, FTO is a document
that holds a finding by a patent attorney or other researcher stating that the firm’s
IP portfolio does not infringe on extant IP and that the firm should have the right
to operate freely, i.e., with minimal exposure to infringement litigation. This
somewhat technical view should, however, not be confused with the strategic
concept of FTO and its particular ability to protect value creation options. While
some firms may consider having the power to prevent others from copying inven-
tions to be an important motive,16 many other actors are predominantly inter-
ested in a somewhat broader concept of FTO: the ability to compete in a fair
marketplace on the merits of the product without being excluded by opportunistic
actors and frivolous patent litigation.
Those firms that do focus on exclusivity rather than FTO tend to concentrate
their attention on just two IPmechanisms: patents and trade secrets. There are, how-
ever, a host of other mechanisms available—such as exploiting lead-time advantages
or building strategies around complementary assets—that help firms appropriate
value from their inventions. This issue contains several examples of such strategies,
notably the value appropriation framework by Conley et al. as well as Chesbrough
and Chen’s work on leveraging dormant technologies.17 Adding to Oberholzer-Gee
and Fisher’s overview of strategic options in IP management,18 we posit that patents
do not serve all those purposes equally, effectively, or efficiently. Combining and
orchestrating the variety of available mechanisms is indeed of key importance.
Today, a firm’s IP strategy not only has to secure access to technological knowledge,
but also needs to serve the strategic intentions and motivations of a firm. IP mecha-
nisms serve many purposes, in particular:19
§ owning exclusive rights to commercialize an invention,
§ preventing others from copying or imitating an invention or product,
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§ preempting competitors in a development race,
§ ensuring freedom to operate, or
§ signaling technological strength.
As this issue’s collection of advances in new IP strategies highlights, a firm’s
appropriability and commercialization motivations, its business model, and its product
development approach need to be a defining core of today’s IP strategy. Below,
we introduce and demonstrate different aspects of disclosing an invention to the
public and how it can be used strategically in conjunction with other mechanisms
to support and strengthen the market position of a firm.
Strategic Disclosure
Strategic disclosure pushes the envelope of what is novel and obvious,20
meaning that the next inventor will have to go that much further to justify a patent.
Disclosing an invention to the public effectively establishes distinct boundaries of
what cannot be within any private IP right (IPR),21 and thus clearly belongs within
the realm of IPRs and should be an integral part of today’s IP management. Not all
disclosure is strategic, though (see Figure 1). It is important to approach disclosure
issues with forethought because inadvertent disclosure can be damaging to the firm.
FIGURE 1. Examples of Four Types of Disclosure
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While many people may think that prior art is established solely by publishing, it is
also derived from any representation of the technology or idea. This representation
can come in the form of prototypes, product brochures, specification sheets, web
pages, presentations, conversations in public places, or, in the case of processes, even
in an end product that bears witness to it. Companies have used such disclosures to
invalidate the patents of competitors on the basis of prior art that the patent holder
itself created.
Non-Pecuniary Benefits of Strategic Disclosure
Strategic disclosure, in contrast to patenting, has no limiting prerequisites
such as novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. Furthermore, it is immediately
accessible, whereas patents have a pendency period of at least 18 months. During
this blackout period, a patent application is not visible as prior art.22 If another
patent is filed during that time, it may be considered separately, resulting in two
patents initially being issued for the same invention. Even if the examiner is
reviewing both applications at the same time, any variation may still be regarded
as sufficiently novel and lead to issuance of the patent. In this case, the very
mechanism that is intended to provide the inventor with a benefit becomes a lia-
bility, particularly in dynamic markets where patent races are common. This
increases uncertainty and can lead to costly, drawn-out legal battles. By contrast,
all major publishing services allow patent examiners immediate access to their
prior art databases and journals, so that such publication can be used to invalidate
a patent application in the examination process if it predates a competitor’s filing.
Those same dynamic markets also have secondary effects. Undoubtedly
central to the operational needs of any firm is the collection of tacit knowledge
relating to processes and procedures specific to its product line. Prudent firms will
codify these internally as trade secrets. These secrets, provided they remain secret,
have value to the firm that can last well beyond the typical duration of a patent.
They provide, however, no protection against independent invention or grounds
for invalidating a patent based on such.23 While we do not suggest that strategic
disclosure should necessarily displace trade secrecy, evidence suggests that the risk
of parallel invention and the increasing mobility of inventors and key personnel24
pose a challenge to enforcing trade secrecy.
Due to wide-ranging debates over the optimal nature of patent scope under
policy regimes, patenting authorities have sought to limit the number of indepen-
dent claims in patent applications.25 However, as we will see below, by using stra-
tegic disclosure a firm can project additional claims beyond those officially granted
in a patent. Committing an incremental invention to the state of the art accom-
plishes two things: it prevents third parties from patenting that as part of some
greater invention, and it pushes the envelope of what is novel and obvious. Thus,
even if one cannot obtain a patent to keep competitors at bay, one can restrict
their efforts to gain a dominant position.26
Another convenience emerges from the variety of anonymous methods
to file strategic disclosures. Patent applicants are openly identified and thus, by
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studying the enabling information, outside parties may be able to infer the direc-
tion a firm’s research is taking.27 Through anonymous strategic disclosure, firms
can successfully disguise their strategic intent by breaking up publications into
smaller elements, parsing them out to different outlets, mixing anonymous and
attributed publications, and even contributing elements of disinformation (“red
herrings”), thus making it difficult for curious competitors to re-assemble the
information and draw valuable insights.
Pecuniary Benefits of Strategic Disclosure
One of the prime reasons that firms may consider publishing in addition to
patenting is that the latter is a time-consuming and complex process, which ties up
considerable resources. Although patent filing fees are relatively reasonable—for
SMEs about $500 for filing and examination and another $5,000 inmaintenance fees
over the lifetime of the patent28—very few individuals or firms have the training or
inclination to prepare and convey the patent application through the process. By
adding the expense of a patent attorney (the average patent requires 20–25 hours
for a skilled patent attorney to draft, not to mention the inevitable office actions
required to clear up discrepancies brought up by the examiner) legal fees for patent
preparation go easily up to $10,000-$30,000 per patent for just the United States.29
Since this processmust be repeated in each patenting jurisdiction, the cost of effective
global coverage for a patent is many multiples of that amount. Given that most prod-
ucts represent an integrated bundle of IP, the possibility of obtaining comprehensive
protection for a given product is well beyond the capabilities of many smaller
actors.30 Strategic disclosure, by contrast, has much lower fee requirements: The
major service providers charge amounts of a few hundred dollars per publication.
Since there are no particular formatting requirements, multiple publications can be
filed for much less than the cost of preparing a single patent. In addition, one publi-
cation establishes prior art worldwide, making strategic disclosure a huge multiplier
in comparison to the cost of global patent coverage.
To summarize, the current idiosyncrasies of the patent system—notably its
18-month review period, the limits on the number of claims, restrictive patent-
ability criteria, and lastly the enormous cost of global protection—limits the stra-
tegic flexibility that many firms may need today to succeed in the marketplace.
In the following cases, we provide examples of the conditions under which the
practice of strategic disclosure preserves strategic flexibility and growth options
in commercializing inventions.
Illustrative Case Studies
To explore the conditions and the manner in which firms have integrated
strategic disclosure into their IP strategy, we examine the innovation practices of
four companies that vary in size, geographic location, and their strategic use of
disclosure, as summarized in Table 1. We chose these cases for their exemplary
capacity to illustrate four central concepts in which firms may derive strategic
benefit from integrating strategic disclosure into their IP regimes. We differentiate
these concepts by the intent behind the use of strategic disclosure.
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Strategic disclosure can be used to reveal any form of prior art, both pat-
ented and not patented, and it can find application either alone or in direct rela-
tion to specific patents. If used in relation to specific patents, multiple intentions
can be pursued. First, firms may use strategic disclosure to enhance the benefits
of an associated patent, i.e., extend the scope of a patent by effectively adding claims
to the patent or by stating alternative potential markets or uses for a technology;
both of these would be patent-extend strategies.31 Firms may also choose strategic
disclosure to reveal the contents of an associated patent prior to official publication,
referred to as a patent-reveal strategy. Early revealing of a patent application allows
firms to signal early technological advances and potentially discourage competitive
development.32 Strategic disclosure can also be used to lay the groundwork for
follow-on (collaborative) innovation, i.e., strategically establish common prior art
as a basis for patents filed for later developments, which we refer to as a reveal-patent
strategy. If used without explicit reference to a patent, strategic disclosure serves
multiple purposes, most notably, and widely known, it secures FTO when patents
are difficult, impossible, or otherwise not practical to obtain. Thus, in this article
we also highlight the use of such reveal-level strategies (as in leveling the playing
field) in making less visible prior art more prominently available to strengthen
the future options of a company. Table 2 summarizes those four mechanisms and
their benefits.
TABLE 1. Description of Company Cases
Company
Name Flisom
Perfect Point
EDM
Natural
Dental
Implants Innocentive
Domain Flexible Solar Panels Machining
Equipment
Medical Devices Innovation
Intermediary
Strategic
Motivation
International
expansion
Organic (resource-
efficient) growth of
the firm
Position company as
attractive acquisition
target
Enhance customers’
ability to enact
solutions
Technology
Strategy
Sell production
machinery B2B and
retain right to
develop future
technology
Preserve
technological option
to pursue
Establish
technological
leadership
Clients use
crowdsourcing,
open Innovation
platform
Actions Publish prior
knowledge to
establish
technological base
Publish nascent
technological
discoveries to
preserve right to
pursue in future
Secure core
technology by
proprietary IPR.
Publish process and
method of tertiary
market opportunity
for patented primary
technology
Publish patent day
after application
submission
Preempt
competitors by
publishing early,
thereby discourage
others from
pursuing
development.
By ensuring that
challenge call has
complete
background on
existing knowledge,
challenge document
may establish prior
art and ensures
customer firm FTO
Integrated IP
Strategy
Reveal-Level &
Reveal-Patent
Patent-Extend Patent-Reveal &
Patent-Extend
Reveal-Patent
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Flisom—Flexible Solar Panels
Flisom, a firm specializing in thin-film photovoltaic technology, holds the
record for flexible solar-cell efficiency and owns patents for methods and devices
relating to roll-to-roll manufacturing of photovoltaic modules. The professors and
researchers who founded the company as a spin-out from a university research
center33 had not concentrated their efforts on patenting because they felt that
they had simply optimized processes and technologies that were already known
through scientific literature. They initially felt that their tacit knowledge relating
to processes and methods was the key to the potential success of the firm. However,
they soon learned that simply having superior knowledge would not ensure
success in an increasingly competitive industry.
Competitive Environment and Strategic Motivations of the Company
Based in Switzerland, Flisom could not benefit from the large loans or sub-
sidies that solar cell manufacturers in the U.S. and China are known to enjoy, and
despite having market-leading technology, it was questionable whether it could
TABLE 2. Strategies for IP Disclosure
Strategy What It Is Benefits & Applicability
Reveal-Level Disclose prior art (including
“ancient” art) to prevent others
from patenting
§ Ensure that obscure prior art is in the open
§ Prevents competitors “grandfathering” prior art as
part of patent claims
§ Refreshes old art in examiners’ awareness
§ Patent potential has low NPV
§ Disclosure as a form of Real Option
Reveal-Patent Disclose prior art, patents, and
techniques to establish a level
playing field and prepare common
ground for subsequent invention
that is intended to be patented
§ Enable a creative commons
§ Possibly a market in future where patent would
lead to a market > 10 years
§ Immature / uncertain future market
§ Useful in collaborative ventures
§ Establish the baseline technology standard for
Open Innovation partnerships
Patent-Reveal Patent, then reveal during
18-month blackout window
§ Avoid conflicts about prior art
§ In a technology development race
§ To signal superiority and force rivals to move on
§ May help when seeking to establish dominant design
Patent-Extend Patent technology, then disclose
possible applications,
permutations, modifications, etc.
§ Strong core patent
§ In place of Device + Method patents
§ When applications/methods may not qualify as
claims (marginal inventive step, unknown utility)
§ Unable to move into multiple markets
simultaneously
§ Protect entrepreneurial options
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expand its production enough to benefit from economies of scale. Faced with this
problem, the options were either to become a manufacturer of products for a
niche market, or to perfect the machines capable of producing the superior photo-
voltaics and sell those to product manufacturers. In order to sustain the latter
strategy, the firm had to have a technology pipeline that would allow it not only
to market its current technology, but also to have an ongoing stream of innova-
tions to supply future generations of machines.
While a firm producing completely in-house would be able to hold process
details secret, selling the machines moved the company into a different domain.
Since a machine, once in a customer’s hands, could be copied or technologies
therein could be inferred, reverse engineered, or even patented, Flisom had to
recalibrate its strategy since trade secrets and tacit knowledge could not ade-
quately protect its position. Looking at the strategic options, CEO Anil Sethi real-
ized that the firm had to structure its IP portfolio to secure and move beyond the
knowledge base of its founding team. The new technical know-how would
require some combination of process enhancement and accurate process replica-
tion. Therein, says Sethi, lay the challenge:
“The scientists find the concept of the pilot and manufacturing very prosaic and bor-
ing, not realizing that this is absolutely critical to get stable manufacturing, which is
what you need to be able to provide the product a million or 100 million times a
year of the same quality. And there’s a lot of knowledge in those machine designs
that you can capture and if you capture it properly and if you have a concerted
strategy, you could end up moving up the value chain.”34
IP Strategy—“The Art of the Possible”
Contrary to popular belief, patents are not the engine of innovation; they
are only the means by which inventions are integrated into the collective know-
ledge known as “prior art.”35 It is by the granting of a limited monopoly whereby
society convinces inventors to reveal their proprietary knowledge, and it is this
knowledge that fuels the engine of ongoing innovation. However, as the density
of this knowledge base increases, it becomes harder to judge what is novel and
what has simply been forgotten36 or was never documented in sufficient technical
detail.37 Likewise, many products and technologies have wallowed in obscurity
because they were either released to market before their time or held secret by
initial inventors who lacked the resources to fully develop them. It was these
“holes” in the state-of-the-art with which Flisom had to contend.
The Flisom team was working with what it considered to be knowledge in
the public domain; however, those assumptions had to be tested and evaluated
lest the company find itself threatened with infringement for using such know-
ledge. So Flisom’s CEO Sethi hired a person with a Ph.D. in physics who was
knowledgeable in the art to inventory all of the practices, methods, and technolo-
gies at use within Flisom to determine what was novel, what had business poten-
tial, what was established as prior art, and where the holes in prior art were. With
the help of engineers, the scientists were able to optimize the process area, while
still having the time and inclination to do what scientists do best, look at the
cutting-edge of knowledge.
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Flisom went about classifying the various forms of IP as conceptualized in
Figure 2:
§ Trade Secrets: Key process or product knowledge that could not be reverse-
engineered and that the end product bore no signature of.
§ Patents: Ancillary components that could be copied or could be easily
transferred by personnel changing jobs.
§ Prior Art in the Public Domain: The collection of knowledge upon which
the technology is built, focusing on the published information of the past
or current potential of the field.
Sethi made a point of capturing and documenting all of the knowledge stock of
the firm and classifying each element into one of these three categories. He was
acutely aware that the company could not accurately chart its own intellectual
property until it had defined the origins of prior art upon which it was based.
Yet, he also saw the need for another type of prior art:
“I call them the ‘art of the possible.’ Things that we may or may not want to pursue,
things that may or may not become interesting, things that our guys in their collec-
tive wisdom perceive about what may happen in the next 20 years or longer, and
we don’t necessarily want to spend the money to file patents on these so what
we do is we publish, and it’s too far out there for us to necessarily have a business,
commercial business case for that. At the same time, 20 years is, in the life of a com-
pany, not that long a period of time and you want to make sure you’re future-
proofing yourself. So in that case we used to just publish those in research journals
and so forth. We were happy for other people to use that as well, as long as there
was no blocking us in future.”38
FIGURE 2. Flisom’s Integrated IP Strategy with Publications for the “Art of the Possible”
Protecting Growth Options in Dynamic Markets
130 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY VOL. 55, NO. 4 SUMMER 2013 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
One danger of patenting lies in the fact that a patent can come either too
soon or too late. Firms on the leading edge of technology often find that they
come out with an invention before they really have a market for it, while firms
that take a slow-and steady approach may find that their competitors have beaten
them to the punch.39 This latter argument is much more salient given that the
recent change in the U.S. patent code to first-inventor-to-file no longer protects
the inventor who can demonstrate priority through an ongoing development pro-
cess. In the case of nascent technologies, it may be a benefit to opt for strategic dis-
closure to preserve future opportunities to develop and exploit such a technology.
Flisom chose to integrate strategic disclosure in its IP strategy to firm up the
foundation upon which its technology, both present and future, was based. By
using a Reveal-Level strategy and filling in the gaps between what was assumed
to be prior art and what was documented in technical detail, the company was
assured that no competitor could “grandfather” something in and claim infringe-
ment. In choosing to publish the elements on the extreme leading edge, Sethi saw
the opportunity to not only retain access to the market that would develop in the
future, but also to the work of researchers who would further explore and refine
those nascent technologies.40
Perfect Point EDM
Despite the vast experience and technological development of the machin-
ing industry, there are certain tasks that remain challenging even with today’s
most advanced machine tools. Today’s super-hard metals tend to withstand the
efforts of machining heads, whereas composite materials shatter or fray upon con-
tact with them. One of the most promising technologies is electrical discharge
machining (EDM), whereby the work material is sequentially eroded at the molec-
ular level through the administration of electric “sparks.” The established EDM
methods, known as sinking EDM and wire EDM, have many benefits, but also
severe limitations—mainly that these methods can only work with pre-defined
forms or only in straight line cuts because they use electrodes that issue multiple
discharges simultaneously. Through the development of its single-point discharge
technology, Perfect Point EDM (PPEDM) has opened up a variety of new applica-
tions for cutting and shaping ultra-hard materials in three dimensions and to
exacting standards.41
Strategic Motivations of the Company
Although PPEDM was founded with the intent of creating a robotic 3D
machining tool, management soon became aware of an abundance of alternative
applications for their patented core technology in diverse industry sectors. Jim
Legge, the CEO and founder of PPEDM, was faced with the challenge of deciding
where to take the company. Should he focus on one application in one industry
sector only, or should PPEDM develop and then provide its technology to firms that
supply products for individual sectors? The solution for the initial phase was to
identify a ready market that would allow them to initially sell a product, thus rais-
ing capital while at the same time expanding their expertise in the core technology.
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The first product released by PPEDM, the e-Drill, had the specific function
of cutting the heads off of the rivets that fasten the skins onto bodies of aircraft.
On today’s advanced aircraft, these panels are held on with titanium fasteners that
must be removed by hand using an old-fashioned drill. One panel may have
upwards of 60 fasteners, and a mere slip while drilling out any one of those could
cause damage costing thousands of dollars to repair. The demand for a high-tech
solution combined with PPEDM’s ability to apply their technology to the problem
allowed them to generate revenue while enabling the company to develop and
grow largely in a pay-as-you-go mode.
IP Strategy—Keep Your Options Open
Although PPEDM chose to launch its first product in a lucrative niche mar-
ket, management was fully aware that the core technology would have unique and
profitable applications in several other markets. At that time, PPEDM decided to
focus on strengthening its core technology, especially in the context of the primary
application, while quietly developing the technology for additional applications.
One potential use that Perfect Point management envisioned for its single-point
EDM process was the application of precise textures to the surfaces of medical
implants so that tissue would more easily bond to them. Unfortunately, one man-
ufacturer of cardiovascular stents filed for a patent42 on exactly that method and
cited the core patent underlying PPEDM’s technology, effectively limiting the future
potential of that market for Perfect Point. Faced with the potential of having to pay
license fees and royalties if and when they chose to expand into other markets that
they had not thought to protect, PPEDM’s managers have since included disclosure
in their IP strategy as a means to protect future options while at the same time
adhering to their strategy of organic growth.
The common way to keep alternative market options open is to apply for
device-and-method patents for all of the diverse market applications that might
hold potential future value for the firm. This method, however, is costly and
labor-intensive, so PPEDM chose instead to disclose a number of potential market
applications wherein its technology could provide key advantages. An additional
advantage of this Patent-Extend approach is that PPEDM could make disclosures
both anonymously and through diverse outlets and it could also do so without
directly stipulating its technology by name; it could disclose the methods and refer
to the technology in a more generic term such as “by application of an electric
discharge.” In so doing, it could avoid telegraphing its intent, as patents often
do, and thus reduce the risk of having a competitor block its entry into the
intended market.
Natural Dental Implants
Tooth replacement is commonly a time-consuming and expensive affair,
often entailing complications down the road. So it is no surprise that developing
less invasive, more time-efficient procedures, and safer procedures that limit
follow-on infections and costs was of significant interest in the industry. Natural
Dental Implants, a Berlin-based technology start-up founded in 2006, took up
the challenge.43 While traditional dental replacements consisted of a crown fixed
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by a screw and an abutment piece to the patient’s jawbone, Natural Dental
Implants had developed an innovative solution that would go a step further.
Using x-ray images and a molded impression of the patient’s teeth, the company’s
technology could create an exact replica of the original tooth such that a naturally
formed root could be used instead of screw and abutment piece. This one-piece
root would be implanted immediately after extraction of the dysfunctional tooth
so that, over time, the bone would bond directly to the implant. This procedure
required significantly less time for patient and doctor as well as significantly fewer
complications following the implantation.
Competitive Environment and Strategic Motivations of the Company
By 2010, the company had been successful in raising sufficient seed funds
to allow them to continue an aggressive development plan over the following one
and a half years to create a product ready for clinical use and market launch in
Germany. However, Ruedger Rubbert, the company’s founder and CEO, had no
illusions about the ultimate goal of the company. This was not the market for
small players to turn into industry giants. The natural course of development
was to create a technology-based business in a niche seen as too small or undevel-
oped for the few large players dominating the medical device industry. Rubbert’s
goal was to optimize the technological position of the company such that it would
be an attractive acquisition candidate within the following three to seven years.
His focus was to establish technological leadership in the largest cosmetic dentistry
market in the world, that of the United States. To do so in that hugely competitive
industry—where hundreds of smaller firms were trying to occupy and grow niches
in order to attract one of the dozen big players dominating the field—would take
more than just a good technology base.
IP Strategy — Putting a Stake in the Ground
As a serial entrepreneur with extensive IP experience, Rubbert knew that
his strategic motivations needed to be supported by a strong IP strategy:
“So we developed the patent strategy to build value around our concept and protect
that. The strategy is certainly to cover the biggest markets, U.S. and European, and
to get a framework to protect our concept from different angles process-wise, prod-
uct feature-wise, and, I would say, add to the minefield to a reasonable degree that
you’re recognized.”44
By 2010, Natural Dental Implants had already expended about 15 percent
of its seed funds on filing patents with both the U.S. and the European patent
offices. Starting with the U.S. market, the company worked to extend its core
patents into areas of further development using a complex web of continuation
filings both in the U.S. and in Europe. By filing broad initial claims that were
later adjusted, narrowed, or enhanced while the patent applications were in
process, the company was able to create a solid protective space around its com-
petitive advantage. Strategically using continuations and spinning out related
applications helped establish a strong IP record and an image of strength and
substance. However, this process of going back and forth between patent examiners,
continued filings, and extensions was lengthy and costly. Meanwhile competitive
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pressures steadily mounted. In those instances where it became obvious or
likely that competitors or companies acting in related domains could establish
prior art along their strategic line of business, Natural Dental Implants decided
to disclose:
“We filed the defensive application because we were not ready to file additional pat-
ents but had several ideas and saw other players adding to the minefield in all
aspects of surface conditioning. . . . So we started kind of searching the field, make
all kind of variants out of it, and published a defensive disclosure for at least what
those companies have not applied to our concepts or have not filed yet. We just
kind of blocked everybody, and we hope that nobody’s had an earlier publication
date on their patents.”45
Using a Patent-Extend approach here provides the ability to establish a buffer
zone putting distance between competitors and the company’s core claims. How-
ever, given the aggressive development plan of the company and the tremendous
pressure by competitors vying for attention, it also needed a time advantage. In
such an environment, keeping technological advances under the radar during
the 18-month post-patent-filing blackout period entailed risks. Competitors might
invest in similar developments that could result in a similar patent. The resulting
process of defending the company’s patent and challenging the validity of the
competitor’s filing would be time and resource inefficient, and very likely strain
the resources of the small firm. Rubbert expressed his strategy to deal with those
dynamics as follows:
“In order to get the immediate benefit of a publication so that everybody else
has to be inventive over what has been disclosed, we would basically file a pat-
ent and a couple days later, we would do the same exact specification as a
defensive disclosure. . . . The idea is that you certainly telegraph what you are
doing. . . . In terms of risks, I would rather set the bar high for followers who
want to get similar patent claims through, so the earlier the publication date,
the better.”46
This Patent-Reveal approach served as an effective means of warding off
equal-sized competition. Instead of bearing the cost of following a development
path already established as prior art by others, competitors would find greener
fields by moving on to the next challenge. In this way, Natural Dental Implants
was “buying” additional development time. By combining a strong proprietary
base with disclosure to enable swift diffusion of its concepts, the firm was able
to tip this emerging market in their direction. It established an advantage in both
time and space relative to its direct competitors, thus positioning itself as an attrac-
tive acquisition target.
InnoCentive
Creativity and innovation are often collective tasks of matching problem
solvers’ problems with the instruments needed to solve the problems. Many firms
have part of the solution formula, but lack the resources to obtain the other ele-
ments. Crowdsourcing is a growing practice that allows firms to expand their search
beyond the confines of their local networks by harnessing the power of the internet
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to distribute a challenge and expand the solution set.47 Lisa Reinhold, Vice President
of Client Services at InnoCentive notes:
“We find when you’re able to identify the problem and peel back the onion it actu-
ally is a problem that is more portable across disciplines than the solution they were
originally asking for. So what that means now is that you have more solvers, a
broader community that can now weigh in and try to solve that problem, than
you ever have had before.”48
InnoCentive identified the need for a platform for what it calls Challenge-
Driven Innovation, whereby the identity of the “seeker” (the firm looking for solu-
tions) is hidden. It goes to great lengths to obscure the nature of the challenge so
that it does not telegraph to competitors or markets. Once a challenge is
announced, the seeker reviews any proposed solutions and ultimately decides
on a winner. Only when the winning solution has been decided does the “solver”
learn the identity of the seeker. InnoCentive then facilitates the transfer of the
solution IP to the seeker, ensuring that the seeker has an unfettered right to use
of and profit from the solution. Seekers may choose to maintain strict confidenti-
ality and insist that the solver be bound by a non-disclosure agreement.
IP Strategy of “Seekers”
Despite the solution-oriented aspect of the challenges, the majority of
seekers are not overly concerned with exclusivity, making it clear that their pri-
mary concern is having freedom to use the solution. In working with seekers,
InnoCentive’s team helps them to reduce the problem to component parts and
examine which of those components they can already solve; quite often this
results in the revelation that an entire process is held up by a single stumbling
block. “They just need freedom to practice because it’s not always core to their
value proposition or what they’re trying to accomplish to solve that particular
problem.”49 In these cases, the solution is a means whereby the seeker can derive
a patentable product that is essential to the firm.
Clearly, for all parties, novelty and prior art are major concerns. Solvers are
not permitted to offer solutions that are encumbered by IP restrictions, and this is
easily proven by a search of IP and prior art databases. Since the challenges must
be sufficiently detailed in order to steer the solvers in the right direction, and since
they are posted in a public or semi-public forum, they are strategic disclosures.
InnoCentive encourages seekers to be as thorough as possible. Not only does this
generate a better solution set, but it also prevents any solver from claiming propri-
etary rights over any of the fundamental elements of the challenge itself. Likewise,
InnoCentive works with the solvers to ensure that they document all elements of
their solutions to ensure they are not relying on existing IP and to avail the seeker
of all component elements.
The more difficult situation arises when a solution is offered that the seeker
is already aware of. InnoCentive provides a caveat to seekers that it is their
responsibility to provide documentation in the event that a solver makes a claim
of misappropriation. This becomes all the more complex when a solver indepen-
dently arrives at a solution that the seeker had already developed. InnoCentive
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advises that seekers can require solutions to be novel and can reject any solution
that fails their test of novelty; however, in the event of a challenge the seeker
must provide documentation—not the mere claim—of prior knowledge. While
this documentation can be internal information, there must be significant proof
that the documentation was generated prior to the initiation of the challenge. This
is one reason that InnoCentive encourages its clients to strategically disclose the
underpinnings of the challenge, thus providing incontrovertible priority. “We do
have certain organizations who actually do it as part of the challenge formulation
process, and then again as they understand the landscape.”50
By disclosing anonymously and distributedly, either by separating the
problem into smaller challenges or by disclosing by means other than the chal-
lenge statements, the possibility of the seeker signaling intent can be eliminated
while at the same time ensuring the freedom to utilize the prior art in their
own future technology strategy, including patenting. This Reveal-Patent approach
can be quite beneficial to the seekers.
Summary: Disclosure as Part of an Integrated IP Strategy
All of the cases above illustrate firms’ use of strategies that combine trade
secrecy, patenting, and at least one disclosure strategy. While the strategic motiva-
tion of each company may be different, they all share the goal of freedom to operate.
Their implementation of these methods of selective revealing not only demon-
strates their strategic intent, but also indicates a higher understanding of the ben-
efits that an agile integrated IP strategy can bring.
For Flisom, the Reveal-Level approach served several important goals. First,
it provided a cost efficient way to establish a level playing field on the grounds
of historical prior art. Given the increased workload patent examiners face, they
have precious little time to spend researching prior art. Some companies merci-
lessly attempt to profit from this fact, trying to get obscure prior art “grandfath-
ered” into a patent by including it in claims and hoping to get it past the
examiner.51 Naturally this has detrimental effects if one finds oneself on the
receiving end of such competitive action. Second, by choosing to reveal some of
the nascent science developed, Flisom utilized disclosure as a real option to enable
future patent development. Normally, real options reasoning52 requires a minimal
ongoing investment thus amortizing the sunk cost over time instead of fully pur-
suing the development up front. By contrast, using strategic disclosure as a non-
cash investment on a future option, firms start their option investment program
with a “down-round,” but in so doing they permanently secure the option to
explore and exploit the technology in the future. Similar “options thinking” char-
acterized Perfect Point EDM’s choice to engage in a Patent-Extend approach.
PPEDM felt it enabled them to explore multiple opportunities and focus on the
one that served the best immediate need while still preserving the ability to appro-
priate future returns in additional markets.53
The choice by Natural Dental Implants to integrate multiple disclosure strat-
egies in its IP regime provided multiple tools with which it could gain advantage
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over competitors and make its product and technology portfolio attractive to
potential suitors. The Patent-Extend method allowed it to create a buffer around
its patented technology while the choice to Patent-Reveal served the purpose of
waving the victory flag and signaling to its competitors that they would be better
off moving on to the next challenge. An interesting twist on the revealing strategy
is displayed in the InnoCentive case. While InnoCentive has no interest in the IP
generated by the contests it hosts, its seekers may integrate a strategy of Reveal-
Patent. This specifically acknowledges the necessity for prior art to assure clear
access to the solutions provided through the services of the company. This is of
crucial importance when dealing with collaborative partnerships or even licensing
agreements.54
In summary, firms that integrate strategic disclosure into their IP manage-
ment strategy tend to do so in a systematic manner. The executives interviewed
accept that there are concrete conditions whereby disclosure is a valuable tool
and they have systems in place to take advantage of them. This entails having a
set of guidelines that allow for when and how disclosure is to be accomplished.
Such a system shields the managers or decision makers from backlash or being
seen as downgrading value.
The Double-Edged Sword of Strategic Disclosure
Applying an effective mix of IP mechanisms requires focused attention on
the interplay of the competitive setting and strategic motivations of the company
as well as creative foresight of potential future options. Not doing so can lead
to significant disadvantages. As an illustration, Progressive Insurance licensed a
pay-as-you-drive insurance technology to Norwich Union Insurance of England.
Norwich partnered with IBM to improve the technology, resulting in the integra-
tion of an encryption system—a feature Progressive had failed to include in its
patent or to publish as an optional addition to its system. IBM filed a patent for
the encrypted version of Progressive’s pay-as-you-drive system, citing the Pro-
gressive patent as prior art. As customer adoption test showed, encryption was a
key feature to diffuse the system. As Progressive had failed to secure correspond-
ing claims, or taken the simple measure of publishing it, it was subsequently
forced to pay a royalty to IBM to use its own innovation.55
Why did Progressive (and many other firms, according to our own surveys)
not think about claiming future options through such simple means as strategic
disclosure? As we previously stated, the dominant reason may simply be a lack
of awareness. Although having proven its worth to some of the largest technology
firms in the world, strategic disclosure has yet failed to gain a solid foothold in
strategic practice throughout industry. That shortfall may be partially due to the
fact that there is relatively little education for managers and top executives on
IP strategy, and the few existing educational programs, from our experience, tend
to focus on patenting at the operational level. Another reason for resistance some-
times posited by professionals is that strategic disclosure is a commitment that
offers no looking back. As soon as an invention has been disclosed, the disclosed
technology cannot be patented, even by the disclosing party.56 An executive from
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one disclosure firm stated that this is the hardest barrier for managers to over-
come. Some managers would rather watch a competitor reduce the value of an
invention to zero than consider the option of retaining the future potential to
exploit that technology at the cost of the unknowable value of a nascent patent.57
Another reason why strategic disclosure may not have reached widespread
use in industry may be that smaller firms tend to have less-formalized procedures
for evaluating IP and thus rely more on external IP attorneys, which introduces an
agency dilemma as those attorneys make money by writing patents. Furthermore,
many patent attorneys are conditioned to see things in a tactical sense; without a pat-
ent there is no property to defend and no power to enforce. The fact that ownership
also conveys liability, and that there is a direct correlation between the firm size of
the patent holder and likelihood of being subject to litigation,58 means that an
increase in a firm’s patent portfolio also increases the chances of future litigation—
and, possibly, defense revenues for the attorney.
As one CEO pointed out:
“Lawyers do law; they don’t do business provisioning, strategy, exit, valuation,
those components that may be important for you. . . . as a business guy, I like to
know, for example, my exit options. I want it to be clear, and the business of a law-
yer is to paraphrase everything. You cannot relegate these components to the law-
yers otherwise you just end up compounding your risks.”59
Intellectual property is a major strategic asset for any technology firm, not
simply a legal tool. Strategic IP management requires that a firm be proactive
(as echoed in Cesaroni and Piccaluga in this issue60), allowing cross-functional
teams to evaluate potential IP, train them in the strategic aspects, and set clear
processes and guidelines. Appropriating value from a firm’s knowledge is in fact a
carefully orchestrated interplay of different functions, in which, as Conley et al.
strikingly demonstrate,61 patent-based IP is only one of the many forms used. In
Table 3, we propose some specific situations that might lead executives to consider
either using strategic disclosure, or avoiding it. In general, if the firm has technology
that is commercializable in a current market, and feels that its IP barriers are strong,
TABLE 3. Guidelines for Integrating Strategic Disclosure
Consider using Strategic Disclosure as part
of an integrated IP strategy when . . .
Strategic Disclosure can have
limits when . . .
. . . freedom to operate is your primary concern.
. . . you want to reduce your patenting and litigation costs.
. . . you derive more revenue from product-related
services than from the product itself.
. . . your product can be easily reverse-engineered or
invented-around.
. . . there are numerous and/or broad applications for the
technology.
. . . you are not certain that your trade secrets can/will
remain secret.
. . . yours is a stand-alone business.
. . . your business model is heavily dependent
upon licensing.
. . . you have a highly novel technology with
near-term market potential.
. . . you intend to seek outside or VC funding.
. . . your technology has a narrowly defined
market application.
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and relies on selling access to its technology in its current markets, strategic disclo-
sure may not be a good choice. On the other hand, if the technology will not be
ready for several years, or the firm is not ready to move into other applications of
its own technology, or if the option value of future market entry is high, strategic
disclosure of some parts of the IP portfolio may be an excellent choice.
Conclusion
Technology firms can strategically integrate patenting and non-patenting
mechanisms to effectively protect valuable technological assets and encourage
growth. Strategic disclosure, and its ability to protect FTO, serves as an instrument
that allows firms to appropriate returns from their inventions. The cases we have
outlined show how technology managers can gauge the feasibility of different IP
strategies given a particular set of motives and circumstances. As alternatives to
the prevailing dichotomy of patenting vs. secrecy, these illustrative examples demon-
strate how non-patenting disclosure can either substitute for resource-intensive
patenting or can be combined to enhance the value of the patents. Publishing
inventions—either in conjunction with existing patents, or as a substitute—can yield
significant benefits in terms of speed, cost, and available options in the innovation
and commercialization process, thus helping protect and strengthen the market posi-
tion of firms in highly dynamic market environments.
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